The Norm, Not the Exception
While the 79th Division proves a particularly strong example, the deficiencies of American training, both on the enlisted and senior officer levels, were evident throughout the AEF. German observations after the Battle of St. Mihiel concluded, despite their defeat, that the Americans were of little threat*:
Concluding Estimate: The American is too much of a dilettante, and therefore also in a major attack needs not to be feared. Until now, our men had much higher opinion of the Americans, due to the fact that in patrol undertakings they had shown themselves as dashing soldiers… Our troops had expected much more of them in major battle. In spite of some local reverses, their confidence of being able to deal with the Americans has been raised.[1]
Aside from general inexperience with trench warfare, combined arms doctrine and the various new tactics and technologies that the Great War brought, according to Antulio Echevarria, the AEF suffered from a lack of experience with operational science. This includes “areas of higher-level coordinations of fire and movement; timely issuance of orders, communication, and coordination with adjacent units and higher headquarters; and logistics.”[2] All these areas are ones that would have been covered in divisional maneuvers which, as mentioned earlier, rarely took place and were all areas of difficulty for the 79th and the rest of the AEF.
The Citizen-Soldier Theory
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The concept of the citizen-soldier is one that has played a part in almost every war the U.S. has fought. The general idea is that, in times of war, regular American citizens will step up to fight for their country and then return to their regular jobs afterwards, clearly echoing the Minutemen of the 18th Century. According to Antulio Echevarria, the theory was that this body of highly motivated volunteers, while not being as well-trained as professional soldiers, would be able to quickly learn on the job due to their large numbers and therefore be able to operate as an effective fighting force.[3] Unfortunately for the doughboys this concept, combined with the highly restricted training time due to allied demand for American troops and inexperienced seniors officers, would lead to faulty doctrine and extremely high casualty rates, especially in the opening days of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. While America's citizen-soldiers did learn, "on the job" became more literal than initially intended.
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Courtesy of Warfare History Network
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Looking Forward
Yet, despite its problems, the AEF was still successful. During the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the Americans inflicted over 100,000 casualties on the German Army, captured 26,000 men, 874 guns and over 3,000 machines guns and forced the Germans back more than 30 miles, ultimately helping to bring the war to its final conclusion.[4] Even in the short time that it saw action, the AEF improved its overall coordination and communication, adopted and refined tactics more suitable to the battlefields of the Western Front, got more efficient at building roads and organizing traffic and generally improved in almost every area, essentially learning all that the other warring nations had learned in 4 years in a matter of months.
While the story of the 79th’s assault on Montfaucon is by no means one of glowing success, even in those short few days the division saw improvement and by the end of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive had adapted to modern war along with the rest of the AEF. The story of the 79th Division clearly exemplifies how the First World War proved vital in the US military’s adaptation to the growing prowess of operational science and the numerous tactics, strategies and technologies that would come to define warfare for decades to come.
While the story of the 79th’s assault on Montfaucon is by no means one of glowing success, even in those short few days the division saw improvement and by the end of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive had adapted to modern war along with the rest of the AEF. The story of the 79th Division clearly exemplifies how the First World War proved vital in the US military’s adaptation to the growing prowess of operational science and the numerous tactics, strategies and technologies that would come to define warfare for decades to come.
Citations
Cover Photo: German Observation Post on Montfaucon (Courtesy of Betrayal WWI)
[1] Quoted in Fax, 205.
[2] Antulio Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2014), 117.
*The Germans had been in the process of pulling out of the St. Mihiel salient at the time of the American assault.
[3]Echevarria, 171.
[4] Fax, 21.
[1] Quoted in Fax, 205.
[2] Antulio Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2014), 117.
*The Germans had been in the process of pulling out of the St. Mihiel salient at the time of the American assault.
[3]Echevarria, 171.
[4] Fax, 21.
